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This paper exanlines Ihrcc competing hypotheses: racial threat, social contact and racial 
resentment. Using individual level and aggregate level data. these three hypotheses are tested by 
examining white racial attitudes, and a variety of contextual variables, on the prospective vote for 
a white racially conservative candidate. The evidence provides support for all three of these 
hypotheses. Racial threat is found to be conditioned by the black population density and the resent- 
ment that whites direct toward African Americans. The probability that a white person will support 
a racially conservative candidate does not depend solely on the black population. Indeed. it is 
reported here that racially sympathetic whites, who live in areas with high black populationdensities 
are highly unlikely to support a racially conservative candidatc. providing support for the social 
contact hypothcsis. On h e  other hand, whites living in the same context. but who express rescnunenl 
toward African Americans, are almost certain to support dle racially conservative candidatc. Thesc 
findings point to an innovative approach to examining tlie racial threat hypothesis. 
Giles and Buckner (1993) contend that race no longer plays "the central 
defining role in southern politicsn (711). To be sure, the South no longer 
serves as the haven for racist demagogues and the home of Jim Crow laws. 
Similar to the'rest of the country, overt racism is no longer tolerated in 
this region. Despite the change in the way that white racial attitudes are 
1 expressed, however, inequalities continue to persist. Whites in the South, for 1 
' j example, remain overrepresented in almost all elected positions in the polit- 
ical process, while blacks remain grossly underrepresented (Reeves 1998). 
This phenomenon can largely be attributed to racially polarized voting 
(Bositis 1998; Kleppner 1985; Loewen 1990; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). 
where whites vote for the white candidate and blacks vote for the black can- ' 1 didare. Because blacks constitute a minority in many jurisdictions, they are 
i unable to elect the candidate of their choice. Arguably, the transformation 
of the region from a Democratic stronghold to a Republican stronghold at 
the presidential level (Black and Black 1992). the change in party identifi- 
-- 
cation from Democrat to Republican by many white southern elected offi- 
cials and the massive resistance to majority black districts by white south- 
erners, point to a different type of racism that ultimately produces similar 
ends as those encountered in previous eras. Indeed, Sears et al. (1997) 
BYRON D'ANDRA OREY is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
The American Review of Po!irics, Vol. 22. Summer. 2001: 233-255 
@",,A, .",. I .. ..: .. I> .. : ... . .C ,,..,:.:..- 
234 1 Byron D 'Andra Orey 
conclude that even after the passage of civil rights legislation, "considerable 
racial inequality remains in many areas of the society, such as in income, 
wealth, educational attainment, health, crime, and so forth" (16). 
This article expands on the author's previous work examining white 
racial attitudes on the prospective vote for a white racially conservative 
candidate by developing competing hypotheses. In a prior study, Knuckey 
and Orey (2000) examined the 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial race featuring 
an African-American liberal and a white conservative. These authors con- 
tend that the white candidate used subtle racist tactics to capture the vote 
from racial conservatives. These tactics are argued to be different than those 
employed by racial demagogues of the past. Even in a Deep South state like 
Louisiana, whites no longer believe that African Americans are biologically 
inferior to whites (e.g., "redneck racismn). The old racism of yesterday has 
transformed into a new belief that African Americans simply do not live by 
the work ethics espoused within the United States (see, Howell 1994). This 
new form of racism has acquired many names, including "symbolic racism" 
(Sears and Kinder 197 l) ,  "modem racismn (McConahay 1986). "subtle rac- 
ism" (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), "racial resentmentn (Kinder and Sand- 
ers 1996) and "Laissez-faire racism" (Bobo 1997). It does not take the bla- 
tant form associated with the old racism, but it is more subtle (see Edsall 
and Edsall 1991, Ch. 10). 
In addition to examining white racial attitudes, a contextual analysis is 
conducted in an effort to test the "black density" or "racial threat" thesis. 
Recent studies in the area of race and politics have drawn conclusions noting 
the failure of the racial threat hypothesis in explaining the white vote for a 
racially conservative candidate or the white vote against an African-Ameri- 
can candidate (see e.g., Voss 1996 and Carsey 1995). Here, I take the posi- 
tion that these analyses are incomplete and that the conclusions are prema- 
ture. This research is argued to be incomplete because of data limitations. 
Studies that have included aggregate level data fail to test competing theories 
of racism as explanations for white vote choice. Those studies using indi- 
vidual level data, on the other hand, also have been hindered by data limita: 
tions because these data are often secondary and do not contain questions 
relating to racial attitudes (although, see Kinder and Sears 1981). 
Kinder and Sears (1981) state that, "although theories of racial preju- 
dice have been extensively catalogued, empirical confrontations between 
competing theories are surprisingly rare in the social sciences" (414). 
Following the lead of these authors, the research at hand investigates the 
impact of racism and racial density in explaining the intended white support 
for a racially conservative white candidate. The 1995 Louisiana guberna- 
torial race, featuring an African-American candidate, Cleo Fields, and a 
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white candidate, Murphy J. "Mike" Foster, is a case in point.' Three theo- 
retical frameworks are examined here: racial threat, derived from the polit- 
ical behavior literature, social contact, derived from the social psychology 
literature and racial resentment, derived from the political psychology 
literature. 
Black Threat, Social Contact and Racial Resentment 
According to Key (1949) "The hard core of the political South-and the 
backbone of southern political unity-is made up of those counties and sec- 
tions of the southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial propor- 
tion of the population. In these areas a real problem of politics, broadly 
considered, is the maintenance of control by a white minority (5). He went 
on to note "Those whites who live in counties with populations 40, 50, 60, 
and even 80 percent Negro share a common attitude toward the Negro (Key 
1949, 5). Moreover, "[ilf the whites of the black belts give the South its 
dominant political tone, the character of the politics of individual states will 
vary roughly with the Negro proportion of the population (Key 1949, 5). 
Based on the analysis conducted by Key (1949). white support for 
racist candidates was found to be strongest in those black belt counties 
where there were high concentrations of blacks. This phenomenon has since 
been labeled "black threat" (e.g., Giles and Hertz 1994). Wright (1977) 
confirms Key's thesis in an analysis assessing the white vote for Wallace in 
the 1968 presidential election. Using individual level data and an aggregate 
measurement of black density, Wright concludes that black density has an 
indirect effect on the white vote for Wallace. Giles and Buckner (1993, 
1995) find support for the racial threat hypothesis in their examination of the 
white vote for David Duke across parishes in Louisiana in the 1990 United 
States Senate race. 
According to Campbell (1965), whites are threatened by the real possi- 
bility of African Americans infringing upon their social, political and eco- 
nom- This t y p  csf threat has been categorized as a realistic 
group cortflict between blacks and whites. Based on this notion, conflict is 
expected to be highest when groups are competing over limited resources. 
Given this scenario, the black threat hypothesis predicts that whites will 
view any gains made by blacks as a zero sum game.2 
Contrary to the racial threat hypothesis is the social contact hypothesis. 
This hypothesis holds that as majority group members interact with members 
of the minority, they become more racially t~ le ran t .~  According to Lazars- 
feld et al. (1968, 137), "voting is essentially a group experience. People 
who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same candidate." 
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Carsey (1995) provides empirical support for the social contact hypoth- 
esis. The author reports that, the higher the black density in precincts in 
New York City and Chicago and boroughs in New York City, the higher the 
probability that a white person voted for the black candidate. These findings 
seem to indicate that race played only a benign role in the two elections that 
were examined, given a reliance solely on the black threat hypothesis. It is 
argued here, however, that such a conclusion is premature due to data limi- 
tations. In other words, the data used by Carsey do not allow for an alter- 
native explanation of racism, as suggested by Kinder and Sears (198 1). Voss 
(1996) also provides some support for the social contact hypothesis by 
reporting a negative estimated effect of racial density on vote choice for 
parishes (the name for counties in Louisiana) in Louisiana that are at least 
75 percent urban. Voss reports that those whites in Louisiana who resided 
in urban areas, and areas with high black densities, were least likely to have 
voted for David Duke in the 1990 U.S. Senate race, the 1991 gubernatorial 
open primary, and the 1991 gubernatorial runoff. Again, as was the case 
with Carsey, Voss's analysis is constrained by data limitations, in that he is 
unable to test a competing hypothesis of racism (i.e., does not provide for 
an alternative explanation of racism). 
Symbolic racism (same as racial resentment), a concept originally 
articulated by Sears and Kinder (1971), posits that white racial attitudes are 
no longer shaped by "biological racism," the notion that blacks are an inher- 
ently inferior race to whites. These authors note that individuals who possess 
symbolic racial attitudes believe "that blacks violate such traditional Ameri- 
can values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and 
discipline" (Kinder and Sears 1981,416). According to Sears (1988). sym- 
bolic racism is comprised of an antiblack affect and traditional American 
moral values. One of the principal architects of the symbolic racism concept, 
Kinder, (see Kinder and Sanders 1996, Appendix A), has reconsidered his 
decision to use symbolic racism to describe these attitudes and has opted 
(along with Sanders) to use "racial resentment" as a description for such 
at thdes.  The research Bere W w  the k i d  of Kinder and Sanrters and 
employs racial resentment as the label for the racial attitudes described in 
this paper. 
The following questions are adopted by Kinder and Sanders (1996, 
106-107) to operationalize racial resentment: 
Blacks should work harder. (1) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other 
minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do 
the same without special favors. (2) Most blacks who receive money from 
welfare programs could get along without it if they tried (1986 NES). 
(3) It's really a matter of some people not hying hard enough; if blacks 
1 would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
I lj Denial of continuing racial discrimination. (4) Generations of slavery 
and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks 
to work their way out of the lower class (1986 and 1992 NES). 
Undeserved advantage. (5) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten 
less than they deserve (1986 and 1992 NES). (6) Government officials usu- i ally pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than 
from a white person (1986 NES). 
9 Among the questions presented above, Howell (1994) uses questions 1, d 2, 4 and 5 to operationalize symbolic racism. The research at hand follows 
I the lead of Howell. There have been a number of criticisms regarding the face validity of 
k the symbolic racism concept. Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman and 
Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) 
argue that the symbolic racism construct fails because it confounds the racial 
attitude with the policy choice (e.g., affirmative action). Said differently, 
these authors suggest that the dependent variable (affirmative-action) is not 
much different than the independent variable (symbolic racism), thus making 
the relationship between the two a "tautology" (Sniderman and Tetlock 
1986, 135). The research here is able to avoid this concern because the 
dependent variable is vote choice. Additionally, Sniderman and his col- 
leagues criticize proponents of the symbolic racism concept for not including 
such race neutral controls as individualism and egalitarianism in their exam- 
ination of the impact of racial attitudes on racial policy and the vote choice 
for racially conservative candidates. Both of these controls are included 
here. Moreover, by including these two variables we can test whether an 
antiblack effect is present. Sears (1988, 70) states that, one way to detei- 4 
mine if an antiblack effect is present is to test the effects of "symbolic rac- 1 ism (or racial attitudes in general)" while controlling for nonracial attitudes. I; 
r - Despite irs criEkisffts, bwever, sy&& rat:* kaf sewed as a strong E explanatory variable for a variety of individual-level political attitudes (Howell 1994; Gilens 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears et al. 1997; Alvarez and Brehm 1997; Huddy and Virtanen 1998). Sears and Kinder, 
along with their colleagues, have attempted to address most of these criti- 
cisms. For example, Kinder and Sanders (1996, 117-120) find racial resent- 
ment to outperform such control variables as individualism and egalitarian- 
ism, in the explanation of white American's opinions on race policy. These 
authors also find biological racism and racial resentment to be distinct 
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concepts. In addition, Sears, Laar, Corrillo and Kosterman (1997) find 
symbolic racism to be a strong explanation for whites' opposition to equal 
opportunities for blacks, even when controlling for such nonracial values as 
individualism, morality/sexuality and authoritarianism. Howell (1994)' con- 
trolling for both old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism, reports that 
symbolic racism outperforms old-fashioned racism. While symbolic racism 
is highly significant in each of her three models examining the vote for 
David Duke, old-fashioned racism fails to achieve statistical significance. 
Alvarez and Brehm (1997) find symbolic racism to be a strong explanation 
for opposition to racial policies, even when controlling for rival hypotheses 
such as authoritarianism and individualisn~. 
The 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial Election 
Two weeks prior to the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial primary, a white 
candidate, Murphy J. "Mike" Foster, converted from the Democratic party 
to the Republican party and made strong appeals to the whitc electorate. 
This conversion increased his self-proclaimed image as a conservative. 
Foster's campaign included a call to repeal affirmative action, support for 
the plaintiffs in the Hays v. Louisiana case challenging the majority African- 
American congressional district in which Cleo Field was the incumbent, and 
opposition to the federal Motor Voter law, all of which have potentially 
negative repercussions for the African-American community. Foster also 
campaigned heavily for the right to carry a concealed weapon and pushed 
hard on issues relating to crime. Foster refused to repudiate the endorsement 
he received from former Ku Klux Klan leader and white supremacist David 
Duke. In addition, Foster admitted to having paid $150,000 for Duke's 
mailing list. 
Although the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election campaign did not 
entail the overt racism present during Key's (1949) research, there were 
detections of racial coded language used by Foster. Hagen (1993) charges 
tkrtt ReftttMlcm c & m  have a & p d  a "m lmgmgeef  mc" (e 
According to this line of reasoning, white candidates use "code words" to 
refer rhetorically to matters pertaining to race. According to Edsa11 and 
Edsall (1991, 5-6), racial code words have hidden meanings-they are im- 
plicitly race-laden. One example of Foster's use of racial coded language is 
his statement that predominately white Jefferson Parish ". . . is right next. 
to the jungle in New Orleans and it has a very low crime raten (cited in Ott 
1995, 2). 
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Hypotheses 
This study is designed to examine the impact of racial and non-racial 
attitudes on the prospective vote for a racially conservative candidate. The 
hypotheses below are introduced to test whether racial threat, social contact 
o r  racial resentment contribute to our understanding of the white vote for a 
racially conservative candidate. 
Racial Resentment 
II l :  It is asserted that an increase in racial resentment scores will 
increase the probability of a white person voting for Foster. 
Social Contact Hypothesis 
112: It is asserted that an increase in black density will decrease 
ttze probability of a white person voting for Foster. 
Racial Threat 
The traditional racial threat hypothesis is based on the notion that an 
increase in black density will increase racial conservatism among whites. 
That is, in areas where African Americans are highly populated (compared 
to whites), whites will attempt to maintain their social, political and eco- 
nomic hegemony. 
H3: It is asserted that an increase in black density will increase 
the probability of a white person voting for Foster. 
According to Voss (1996), whites should be most threatened in majority 
black cities where they have lost their political edge and in areas where pov- 
erty and crlme have the potential to ". . . exacerbate racial strife* (1 163). 
H4: It is asserted that the probability of a white person indicating 
a vote for Foster will increase as both black density and tile per- 
colt urban population increases, simultaneously. 
Bonacich (1976) contends that working class whites, who are in direct com- 
petition with African Americans, arc likely to be racially conscrvativc. 
These whites view job competition as a zero sum game, whereby African 
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Americans are given an edge throuih such programs as affirmative action 
and as a result, whites lose. 
H5: It is asserted that an increase in unemploymeni in high black 
density areas will increase the probability of a white person voting 
for Foster. 
The final hypothesis examines the impact of black density and racial resent- 
ment on the prospective vote for Foster. It is argued here that black density 
and racial resentment work as a tandem team to explain the white intended 
vote for the racially conservative candidate. This interaction is said to 
capture what Kinder and Sanders (1996) refer to as a "perceived threat." 
H6: It is asserted that the probability of a white person indicating 
a vore for Foster will increase as both racial resentment and black 
density increase. 
Data and Methods 
The data base for this effort combines two separate components: a sur- 
vey of white registered voters conducted in 1995, and 1990 parish level 
(same as county) census data for the respondents merged with the survey 
data. Thus, measurement is at the level of individual respondents, but an 
aggregate level contextual measure is obtained for each respondent. The 
survey data employed in this paper are drawn from the 1995 Gubernatorial 
Runoff Survey conducted by the University of New Orleans Survey Re- 
search Center. It is a telephone survey in which respondents, consisting of 
registered voters statewide, were selected through random digit dialing (see 
Frey 1989). The Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) system 
was used to record the data. The sample closely reflects the total population 
distribution and the racial make-up of the state. In this analysis only white 
r e s p o n ~ ~  examined because this paper is only irnmxtd in w h k  
racial attitudes. -- -- 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the intended white vote for Foster. It takes 
o n  a value of one, meaning an intended vote for Foster and zero otherwise. 
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression 
for a binary variable is employed. 
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Independent Variables 
Recent research, mainly taken from the social psychology literature (see 
for example, Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986), reveals that whites still possess 
negative attitudes toward African Americans, however, they are careful as 
to how they display these feelings. In the current research, questions tapping 
racial resentment were carefully chosen so that the antiblack nature of the 
question is not made obvious to the respondent. The Likert-type items em- 
ployed to measure racial resentment are drawn from the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research's (ICPSR) National Election 
Study (NES) surveys and the 1985 NES Pilot Study and are combined to 
create an additive index scale (see Appendix C). This is an ordinal level 
variable ranging from zero to one, with zero representing racially sympa- 
thetic whites and one representing whites who express resentment toward 
African Americans. Based on the descriptive statistics, whites score extreme- 
ly high on the racial resentment scale. Out of a possible score of 1.00, the 
average score obtained by whites is .71. It is expected that racial resentment 
will have a positive coefficient, suggesting that those individuals possessing 
resentment towards African Americans will vote for Foster, ceteris paribus. 
Black density is employed as a contextual variable and is operational- 
ized as the percentage of the black population in the respondent's parish (the 
name for counties in Louisiana). The total black population is employed 
rather than the percent black registered voters, because the threat that blacks 
pose to whites is based on the perception of blacks as a whole, and not 
black-registered voters. If black threat is valid, we expect to find a positive 
relationship with intended vote for the racially conservative Republican can- 
didate, Mike Foster, everything else being equal. On the other hand, a nega- 
tive relationship would lend support for the social contact hypothesis. In 
addition to black density, two additional parish-level contextuai variables are 
included: unemployment levels (Giles and Buckner 1993; 1995; 1996) and 
the percentage of the population that is urban (Abrahamson 1980). 
- -ommei& EM an ittreraetkm be inekkd EO capture the 
threat that would exist between inner city blacks and whites. Thus, an inter- 
action between the urban variable and black density variable also is included 
as an independent variable. 
Partisanship is measured by self-identification on a three-point scale 
where Republican identification is high. Similarly, ideology is measured so 
that conservative identification is high. Individualism is measured based on 
a single Likert-type item consisting of a three point scale running from "The 
government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and 
a good standard of living" at one end (zero), to "The government shol~ld 
242 1 Byron D'Artdra Orcy 
just let each person get ahead on their own" at the opposite end (one) (see 
e.g. ,Gilens (1995, 1003)). According to Tuch and Hughes (1996). egalitar- 
ian beliefs reject the notion of social inequality, while placing emphasis, 
instead, on "equality of racial outcomes and promqting action to reduce per- 
sisting inequalitiesn (727). This variable was measured based on the follow- 
ing Likert-type item: "Government should help minorities or they should 
help themselves?" It is operationalized as a three-category variable that takes 
on a value of zero if the respondent indicated that minorities should help 
themselves, a value of .5 represents a response of "in-between" and a value 
of one if the respondent indicated that government should help minorities. 
In addition to the above independent variables, the model also controls 
for other variables found to be related to vote choice. These variables in- 
clude gender (Howell and Pelinka 1994), age (Morin and Balz 1989; Tuch 
1988). income (Giles and Evans 1985; Kinder and Sanders 1996). level of 
educational attainment (Bobo and Licari 1988). Gender takes on a value of 
one for males and zero for females. Income and education are ordinal vari- 
ables ranging from zero to one, where zero takes on the lowest level and 
one takes on the highest level. Age is measured as an ordinal level variable 
in the survey. ranging from zero to one (see Cohen and Dawson 1993). 
Given the expected correlation between some of the aforementioned 
variables, auxiliary regressions were performed for the purpose of detecting 
multicollinearity. The results indicate that there is a high level of multi- 
collinearity amongst the interaction terms and their component variables. 
High levels of multicollinearity result in large standard errors and low 
significance levels. The remedy employed in this paper "centered" the com- 
ponent variables about their means prior to constructing the interaction terms 
(Cronbach 1987; Jaccard, Turrishi, and Wan 1990). This approach will 
result in reduced standard errors, however, it will not affect the magnitude 
of the coefficients of the interactions, nor the calculated slopes for the 
component variables. 
Black Density, Racial Resentment and Vote Choice 
The probability of voting for Foster increases as racial resentment in- 
creases among whites, the respective scores for those with low, moderate, 
and high racial resentment being .32, .65, and .88. Someone who is racially 
sympathetic, meaning that they possess a racial resentment score of zero, is 
much less likely to vote for Foster than someone with a high racial resent- 
ment score of one. In fact, the difference between these two categories is 56 
points. 
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The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 1. As ex- 
pected, racial resentment is highly significant and in the posited direction. 
Both the black density variable and the interactions between percent urban 
and black density, fail to achieve statistical significance, however, the co- 
efficient of the interaction term between racial resentment and black density 
does achieve statistical significance. The interaction takes on a positive sign, 
indicating that those individuals who live in parishes with high concentra- 
tions of African Americans, and who possess high levels of resentment to- 
wards African Americans are likely to vote for Foster. This finding supports 
the notion that a tandem relationship exists between racial density and racial 
resentment in these two variables on the white prospective vote. These 
results run counter to the work of Kinder and Mendelberg (1995). Accord- 
ing to these authors, ". . . under conditions of racial proximity, the role 
played by racial prejudice in white public opinion is considerably reduced" 
(Kinder and Mendelberg 1995, 419). In addition, the interaction between 
black density and unemployment achieves statistical significance, but it is in 
the wrong direction. These findings indicate that whites who live in areas 
with high concentrations of blacks and where the unemployment level is 
high, are less likely to support Foster. Based on Hypothesis 5, such findings 
are counterintuitive. This is an important point that is discussed more fully 
below. 
Nagler (1991) recommends two methods for examining interactive 
effects. The author states that we can either include an interactive (multiplic- 
ative) term (applied in Table 1) or employ a disaggregation method. The 
second method is recommended by Nagler, and it can assist us in better 
understanding the impact of the conditional effects of racial resentment and 
black density, and, black density and unemployment, on the white prospec- 
tive vote. In this case, the black density variable is disaggregated to include 
two categories, whereby the racial resentment and unemployment coeffi- 
cients are examined. The two categories were determined a priori, based 
upon Key's notion that massive resistance toward blacks occurred in those 
counties (in this case parishes) with black populations over 40 percent. The 
first ModeEn TabIe 2represents parishes with black populations less than 
40 percent. According to Table 2, Model 1, the racial resentment coefficient 
for this threshold is 1.94 and highly significant at the .O1 level. The second 
threshold, Model 2, represents those parishes with a black population greater 
than 40 percent. The racial resentment coefficient here, increases to 8.33 
and also is highly significant at the .O1 level, despite an N of only 77. The 
unemployment coefficients are even more illuminating. Table 2, Model 1, 
reveals that the unemployment coefficient takes on a positive value, suggest- 
ing that the likelihood of whites, who live in low black density areas, voting 
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Table 1. Logistic Regression Results for a Model Predicting the 
Intended Vote for Mike Foster in the 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial 
Election (White Respondents Only) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Racial Resentment 
Black Density 
Unemployment 
Urban 
Racial Resentment X Black Density 
Unemployment X Black Density 
Urban X Black Density 
Ideology 
Party Identification 
Individualism 
Egalitarianism 
Age 
Income 
Education 
Gender 
Constant 
-2 Log Likelihood 
N 
Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for the intended vote for Foster and 0 otherwise. 
*pS.lO **pS.05 ***p<.Ol 
Fable 2. Results of Logistic Regression Analysis 
Based on the Percentage of Black Population 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
% Black < 40 % Black > 40 
MLE MLE 
(robust standard crrors) (robust standard errors) 
Racial Rcsentrllent 
Individualism 
Ideology 
Party Identification 
Egalitarianism 
Urban 
Unemployment 
Age 
Education 
Income 
Constant 
N 
-2 Log Likelihood 
for a racially conservative candidate increases as unemployment increases. 
According to Model 2, however, the exact opposite occurs. The coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant at the .05 level. Again, sqch a finding 
runs counter to our expectations. In particular, these findings suggest that, 
whites who live in high black density and high unemployment areas are un- 
likely to vote for Foster. 
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Voting for Foster 
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Racial Resentment 
The results presented in Table 2 are mixed. In those areas where there 
are high concentrations of blacks, the white intended vote choice is condi- 
tioned by the hostility that whites direct toward African Americans. On the 
other hand, whites who live in high black density and high unemployment 
parishes are less likely to vote for Foster. This finding indicates that a real- 
istic group conflict does not exist. Threat should be expected among whites 
who are in direct competition with African Americans. Those who live in 
high unemployment areas would fit this category. In fact, these findings can 
be interpreted as support for the social contact hypothesis. This does not, 
however, negate the fact that a threat is present. It is argued here that a 
"perceived threat" is at work; one that is driven by whites' resentment to- 
wards blacks. These findings are consistent with the conclusion drawn by 
Kinder and Sanders (1996). According to these authors, "[tlhe perception 
of threat has a systematic foundation, but the foundation is provided not by 
actual conditions of conflict and competition but by feelings of racial resent- 
ment" (1996, 90). Moreover, Wright contends that, ". . . conditions in 
one's environment do not influence behavior directly, but rather indirectly 
through social processes and attitudes. . . . A related, but conceptually 
different, i a e r p r u - e s  sees c- 
one's attitudes and values" (1977, 505). 
Figure 1 provides a comparative analysis for both contexts (i.e., low 
and high black densities). Racial resentment is allowed to vary across its 
entire range, while unemployment is set at its minimum value. According 
to Figure 1, whites who live in parishes with high concentrations of African 
Americans and low unemployment levels, and who are racially sympathetic 
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to African Americans are almost certain not to vote for Foster. As racial 
resentment increases, however, the probability of voting for Foster in- 
creases. In short, a white who possesses the highest level of resentment 
toward African Americans is almost certain to vote for Foster. The probabil- 
ity of voting for Foster is higher for whites who live in low black density 
areas, when compared to whites who live in high black density areas, when 
racial rcscntmcnt is low. As racial rcscnt~ncnt scores incrcasc bcyond thc .5 
level, howcvcr, whitcs who livc in arcas with high black dcnsitics arc morc 
likely to vote for Foster than are whites who live in low density areas. In 
fact, whites who live in high black density areas are almost certain (proba- 
bility is equal to .99) to vote for Foster when their racial resentment score 
is perfect (i.e., one). 
Substantively, these findings can be interpreted to mean that whites 
who might rely on the government in their time of distress (e.g., unem- 
ployed), will vote rationally. In other words, given their self-interests, these 
voters will vote for a liberal candidate who is perceived to be more sympa- 
thetic during their time of distress. An alternative interpretation could be 
that whites who live in close proximity to African Americans and who live 
under the same conditions as African Americans will vote like African 
Americans. 
On the other hand, the results suggest that some whites may not have 
the "exit option" (e.g., Tiebout 1956; Hirschman 1970) to relocate or 
escape areas containing high concentrations of blacks. Said differently, some 
whites may not live in high black density areas because they desire to do so, 
they may live there because they do not have the option to "exit" (e.g., can 
not afford to move . . .). As a result, we would expect those voters whose 
desires are to "exit," given their resentment toward African Americans, to 
vote for the racially conservative candidate. In addition, Hirschman (1970). 
in Exit, Voice and Loyalfy, argues that one may feel a sense of loyalty to 
hisfher community and opt not to exit. It is possible that these people might 
not be directly threatened by African Americans, but they may resent them 
and therehe "voice" tbeir resentment with their vote (see, e.g., Hirschman 
1970). Such reasoning captures the heart of what Kinder and Sanders (1996) 
~ , ~ 9 e y ~ W ~ ~ r a c i a l t s r e a t \ a / o s k l i s  
a tandem team to explain the intended vote for a racially conservative candi- 
date. Indeed, these authors conclude that "the perception of racial threat . . . 
is less c o ~ e c t e d  to real circumstance, and it is much more a reflection of 
racial resentments" (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 68). Whether this threat is 
considered to be perceived or not, it clearly provides us with a new way of 
examining racial threat. 
: .. 3 
. : 5. 
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Conclusion 
The title of this article poses the question, is there a new racial threat - 3 ' ; 
in the "newn South? The answer, based upon the findings here, is a condi- 7 9 
tional yes. It si conditional, that is, on the percentage of African Americans i' ! 
that live within a given parish and the level of racial hostility that they direct 
towards African Americans. While some may argue that there is nothing 
new about the racism in the South, it is clearly the case that racial dema- ' ] 
gogues are no longer taken seriously as viable candidates for political office. I 
Indeed, it is the case that ethnocentric candidates, such as David Duke, no 
longer use overt racism while campaigning on the stump. The racist dema- 
gogue has been replaced by candidates who use racial coded language. The 
f 
case ex'nployed here presented an opportunity to examine attitudes toward a 
racially conservative white candidate who employed subtle racist tactics to 
gain the support of racially conservative voters. 
The 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial race is an important contest to exam- 
/ \ 
ine, given that it included both a white and a black candidate. The inclusion 
of this contest is consistent with the original work conducted by Sears and 
1 
Kinder, in 1971. Indeed, much of the research investigating symbolic racism 
and racial threat has employed contests that have featured only white candi- 
1 
! 
dates. The findings here corroborate previous analyses that find racial 
resentment to outperform alternative explanations for white support for a 
racially conservative candidate and white opposition to racial policy. 
The threat reported in this paper differs from the threat of M. The 
threat described by Key was one of actual conflict. The threat described 
here, on the other hand, is described to be a perceived threat. Indeed, it is 
I 
1  
J 
the case that whites who live in high black density areas and high unemploy- 7 i 
ment contcxts are lcss likely to vote for thc racially conscrvativc candidate. 1 
Such findings point to the potential for blacks to build coalitions with neigh- 
boring whites, who live under similar unfavorable circumstances, to defeat 
racially conservative candidates. Moreover, the findings reported here are 1 
i argued to represent a true contextual effect. Unlike previous analyses that ! 
b e  relied s o l e l y  remhs yielded by &e black density variable being 
operationalized as a continuous variable, the disaggregation method allows I 
us to examine each threshold separately. This analysis examines only one 
state, Louisiana. Therefore, it might lack external validity. Despite this limi- / 
I 
tation, these findings provide strong support for racial resentment as a tan- ( 
dem explanation, along with black density, for the intended white vote for I 
a racially conservative candidate. It is recommended that future research be 
conducted to include a larger sample size including other states. 
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Appendix A 
Coding of the Control Variables f 
I 
The control variables and their coding are as follows f 
Racial reser~tr~~cnt: Coded as a 17 category variable where 0 represents racially syhpa. 
thetic whites and 1 represents racially resentful whites. 
Individualism: Coded as a three category variable where 0 = the government should see 
to it that every person has a job . . .; .5 = In between; and 1 = the government should 
just let each person get ahead on their own. 
Egalitariat~isrn: A three category variable where 0 = Minorities should help themselves 
.5 = I n  bctween; and 1 = Government should help minorities. 
Ideology: A three category variable where 0 = liberal; .5 = moderate; and 1 = corn 
servative. 
Parry Identification: A three category variable where 0 = Democrat; .5 = Independent; 
and 1 = Republican. 
Education: A five category variable where 0 = Through 8th grade; .25 = Grades 9-1 1; 
.SO = High School graduate; .75 = Some College; and 1 = College Degree. 
Age: A five category variable where 0 = 18-19; .14= 20-29; .29 = 30-39; .43 = 40- 
49; .57 = 50-59; .71 = 60-69; .86 = 70-79; 1 = age 80 and over. 
Gender: 0 =Female, 1 =Male 
Income: A six category variable where 0 = < $10,000; .17 = $10,000-25,000; .33 = 
$26,000-40.000; .SO = $41.000-60,000; .66 = $61,000-80,000; 1 = Over 80.000. 
Conrext~~al Variables: 
% Black Density110 
% Unemployed110 
% Urban110 
- v m 1- - - 
% Racial resentment X % Black Density 
% Bhck Density X 96 Unemployment 
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Appendix B 
The Wording of Questions Tapping Racial Resentment 
-- 
Now I am going to read several statements. After each one, I would like you to tell me 
whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. 
Receive Less: Over the last few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 
(Disagree) 
Agree Strongly 5.5 
Agree Somewhat 13.4 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 9.5 
Disagree Somewhat 26.5 
Disagree Strongly 39.7 
Minorities Overcame Prejudice: Irish, Italians, Jewish and other minorities overcame 
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special 
favors. (Agree) 
Agree Strongly 39.3 
Agree Somewhat 27.5 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 7.7 
Disagree Somewhat 13.6 
Disagree Strongly 3.2 
In past studies, we have asked people why they think white people seem to get more of 
the good things in life in America such as better jobs and more money-than black people 
do. These are some of the reasons given by both blacks and whites. Please tell me 
whether you agree or disagree with each reason. 
Try Harder: It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If blacks 
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Agree) 
Agree Strongly 39.3 
Agree Somewhat 27.5 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 7.7 
Disagree Somewhat 13.6 
Disagree Strongly 8.3 
SIavety Created Conditions: Generations of slavery and discrimination have created 
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 
@isagree) - - -- -- ---- - - - - -- -- 
Agree Strongly 
Agree Somewhat 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 3.6 
Disagree Somewhat 21.3 
Disagree Strongly 38.7 
New Racial Threat in the New South.? 1 25 
Appendix C 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
- 
% Urban110 494 
% Unemployment/lO 494 
% Black/lO 494 
Gender (Male) 494 
Education 494 
Income 494 
Ideology 494 
Party Identification 494 
Racial resentment 494 
Age 486 
Individualism 486 
Egalitarianism 483 
NOTES 
'This is consistent with the extant literature because much of the contemporary 
work on racial threat has employed Louisiana as a case study (see, e.g., Voss 1996; 
Giles and Buckner 1996. 1995; and Giles and Hertz 1994). 
2Giles and Hertz (1994) contend, that this competition is "conceptualized as con- 
textually conditioned" (317). In other words, "[iln contexts where the threat posed by 
a minority group is high, the dominant group's response is predicted to be more hostile 
than in contexts where that threat is low" (Giles and Hertz 1994, 317). 
'As it relates to the research here, as the minority population increases, we would 
expect the white electorate to begin forming coalitions with the minority electorate. 
4According to Sears (1988, 56), symbolic racism is operationalized based on three 
catcgories: antagonism, rescntmcnt and denial of continuing discrimination. The questions 
adopted in this paper do not possess an antagonism category, according to the require- 
ments set forth by Sears (1988. 57). In addition, it is argued here that the questions 
adopted by Kinder and Sanders (1996. 106-107) support their decision to use racial 
resentment as a descrlptlon o t  whlte racial attitudes. So, whiIe I adopt the questions used 
by Howell (1994), unlike her, I use racial resentment to describe these racial attitudes 
because they seem to really be tapping white racial resentment toward African Ameri- 
cans. 
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qntuitively, one could posit a two-stage model where black density is posited to im- 
pact racial resentment and both racial resentment and black density are posited to impact 
the prospective vote choice. Indeed, Glaser (1994) employs symbolic racism (same as 
racial resentment here) as an endogenous variable. However, his findings yield no sup- 
port for a causal relationship between black density afid those instruments traditionally 
used to measure symbolic racism. In a separate analysis, not reported here, I employed 
a two-stage model where black density was modeled as an antecedent to racial resent- 
ment. This relationship did not hold. Finally, an analysis also was conducted to deter- 
mine if party identification was a function of black density (see e.g., Giles and Hertz 
1994), in addition to being an explanation for vote for Foster. There is no support for 
such a relationship. 
I0One of the criticisms of the racial resentment variable is that it is not valid (i.e., 
it does not encompass an antiblack affect). While feeling thermometers have been used 
in the extant literature (see e.g., Sears 1988) to make this case, data limitations have 
prevented me from using such a measure here. As a result. I have employed a candidate 
evaluation variable for Cleo Fields as a proxy. In an effort to purge this variable of its 
nonracial components, an analysis was conducted whereby the Fields' Image variable was 
regressed on a number of nonracial independent variables that have been used to examine 
candidate evaluation. The residuals from this analysis were saved and a new variable was 
created, now argued to be purged of the perceived nonracial effects. This new variable 
was then employed as an explanation for racial resentment. The results indicate that the 
variable is statistically significant and in the posited direction. These findings support the 
notion that racial resentment does encompass an antiblack effect and is therefore a valid 
construct. 
"Cronbach's alpha is employed to examine the reliability of this construct and 
achieves a value of .68. Sears ct al. (1997, 26) report alpha reliabilities that range from 
.65 to .78, using a variety of data sources. 
"See Appendix C for each of the individual questions and the response rates for 
each of the possible answers. 
"The contextual variables have been divided by 10, therefore, the regression coeffi- 
cients represent the change in the dependent per 10 percentage points change in the inde- 
pendent variable. These transformations were made'in order to avoid very small coeffi- 
cients and standard errors. 
'(There has been some debate as to whether robust standard errors should be used 
in logistic regression. Sribney (1998) indicates that robust standard errors should be 
employed in logistic regression primarily when the model has been poorly specified (i.e., 
the rnodet faits goodness-of-fit testsj. As a precautionary measure, robust standard errors 
a r e  estimated. 
"In a separate analysis not reported here, candidate evaluation models were exam- 
ined using ordinary least squares. The racial resentment variable was the only indepen- 
dent variable to achieve statistical significancc in all thrce of these models. Further, after 
examining the standardized beta coefficients, racial resentment clearly dominated all of 
the other variables that achieved statistical significance. 
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